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Introduction 
 
According to the Lisbon Treaty’s provision, Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) was established in 
2017 with a set of binding commitments aiming to deepen defense cooperation among the 25 participating 
Member States (pMS) including almost all members except for Denmark, Malta and the United Kingdom.2 
Participating Member States committed themselves to achieve a “coherent full spectrum force package” through 
five pillars of implementation.3 PESCO projects have received increased attention, as they are often portrayed 
 
1 Anna Nádudvari (anna.nadudvari@uni-corvinus.hu) is a PhD candidate at the Corvinus University of Budapest. Alex Etl 
(etl.alex@uni-nke.hu) is an assistant research fellow at the Institute for Strategic and Defense Studies of Eötvös József Research 
Center at the National University of Public Service (Budapest, Hungary). Nikolett Bereczky (bereczky.nikolett@uni-nke.hu) is a PhD 
student at the National University of Public Service (Budapest, Hungary).  
2 Notification on Permanent Structured Cooperation to the Council and to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy, [online], 2017. Source: consilium.europa.eu [31 03 2020]   
3 (1) raise the level of investment expenditure on defense equipment to the 2007 collective benchmarks, (2) bring the defense apparatus 
into line with one another as far as possible, (3) enhance readiness, interoperability, and deployability of forces, (4) take the necessary 
measures to tackle the shortfalls perceived in the Capability Development Mechanism, and (5) take part in the development of major 
equipment programs through the EDA. See Annex II of Notification on Permanent Structured Cooperation to the Council and to the 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, [online], 2017. Source: consilium.europa.eu [31 03 2020]   
Executive Summary 
• Out of the 47 running PESCO projects, only 1/5 have more than 7 members, while almost half of the projects 
have only 3 or less participants. Based on coordination and membership accounts, France (31) Italy (26) Spain 
(24) Germany (16), as the Big Four, are the most involved participating Member States. Subsequently, with 
regards to Member States’ involvement in capability areas, the Big Four’s involvement is the most diverse, while 
Poland, the Czech Republic, Netherlands, and Greece are also involved in at least 5 key project areas out of 7. 
• Most PESCO projects contribute to general objectives of creating Enabling capabilities to operate autonomously 
within EU’s Level of Ambition (LoA), while high-end capability contributions are fewer, partly because PESCO 
projects contribute to Capability Development Priorities through complementing other activities and projects 
coordinated by EDA. Therefore, in some cases, the lack of PESCO projects aiming at these missing capability 
priorities can be explained by parallel EDA projects addressing those capability shortfalls. 
• Member states are rather aligning their PESCO capability developments with the Big Four than with anyone 
else. This makes the overall PESCO network fundamentally centralized, in which everyone is tied to the core, 
while the relations among the peripheral nodes are rather limited. 
• Central and Eastern European intra-regional PESCO relations are rather weak, since the participation in PESCO 
did not lead to the emergence of a strong and visible regional sub-cluster. 
• Similarly, the V4 remains less visible within PESCO, suggesting that members of the group did not align their 
efforts in this field.  
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as a forward-moving step with tangible prospects through the embodiment of deeper inter-state defense 
cooperation. There are 47 such projects so far, which had been adopted in three rounds: having the first 17 in 
March 2018, the second 17 in November 2018 and the third round of 13 projects in November 2019.4 
Nevertheless, only a few studies have analyzed the added value of PESCO to European defense capabilities 
and its impact on the broader integration process so far. A policy brief by Efstathiou and Billon-Galland (2019) 
assessed whether the first two rounds of 34 projects had addressed the EU’s identified capability shortfalls by 
cross-referencing PESCO projects against the criteria of the EU’s 2018 revised Capability Development 
Priorities (CDP) and the EU’s Level of Ambition (LoA) requirements.5 A paper by Efstathiou, Hannigan and 
Béraud-Sudreau (2019) assessed progress on the implementation of the first two rounds of 34 projects.6 A CEPS 
research report by Blockmans and Crosson (2019) analyzed the degree of differentiation and convergence in 
Europe’s defense sector based on the three rounds of 47 PESCO projects in total.7 Building on the insights and 
methodologies applied in these previous reports, this paper aims to contribute to their findings by assessing the 
accounts of Member States’ involvement in the existing 47 PESCO projects while cross-referencing all 47 
projects with the Capability Development Priorities and conducting a network analysis of participating Member 
States (pMS) in PESCO projects. 
The paper is structured as follows: the first section introduces PESCO in the context of European defense 
cooperation. The second section turns towards the analysis of projects by the number of participating member 
states; looks at the involvement of participating member states by absolute numbers as well as their involvement 
in projects by areas, cross-referenced with Capability Development Priorities. The third section presents the 
network analysis of participating member states in PESCO projects. Besides the overall PESCO network it 
explores the emerging East-West imbalance within PESCO by analyzing the networks of various member states, 
including France, Spain, Italy, Germany and the Central and Eastern European countries with a special focus 
on the Visegrad Group.  
Data on PESCO projects was accessed through the official PESCO projects website, data collection closing 
on March 4, 2020.8 In cross-referencing projects with CDP priorities we relied on the 2018 CDP revision of the 
EU Capability Development Priorities, issued by the European Defence Agency.9 
 
PESCO projects and the broader context of European defense cooperation 
 
PESCO projects are inevitably linked to the developments of a European defense industrial base through 
economies of scale (cross-border cooperation increasing division of labor and reducing duplications among 
national defense industrial bases) as well as through interoperability, which is a crucial aspect for strategic 
convergence.  
Nevertheless, the ambitions of increasing defense integration through PESCO projects have been perceived 
either with a great deal of skepticism as yet another unsuccessful attempt at deepening European defense 
cooperation, or they have been welcomed with cautious cheers as a small but progressive step towards meeting 
more capability shortfalls of Europe. The functional–political concerns towards the implementation of PESCO 
had been displayed in the different visions of realizing its architecture mainly through the diverging approaches 
 
4 Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) updated list of PESCO projects - Overview, [online], 19 11 2018. Source: 
consilium.europa.eu [31 03 2020] 
5 Yvonni-Stefania EFSTATHIOU – Alice BILLION-GALLAND: Are PESCO projects fit for purpose? [online], 21 02 2019. Source: 
iiss.org [30. 03. 2020]  
6 Yvonni-Stefania EFSTATHIOU – Connor HANNIGAN – Lucie BÉRAUD-SUDREAU: Keeping the momentum in European 
defence collaboration: An early assessment of PESCO implementation, [online], 14 01 2019. Source: iiss.org [30 03 2020.]  
7 Steven BLOCKMANS – Dylan MACCHIARINI CROSSON: Differentiated integration within PESCO – clusters and convergence 
in EU defence, [online], 2019. Source: ceps.eu [30 03 2020]  
8 PESCO Member States Driven, [online], Source: pesco.europa.eu [30 03 2020]  
9 2018 CDP revision – The EU Capability Development Priorities, [online], 2019, Source: eda.europa.eu [30 03 2020]  
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of Germany and France. The achieved structure reflected Germany’s preference towards an inclusive form of 
enhanced cooperation with a high rate of Member State participation and numerous low-end capability projects, 
instead of a more ambitious and avant-garde formation of few capable and willing Member States with truly 
high-end capability projects. Although France promoted this latter (unrealized) concept, Paris took an active 
role in the implementation of this enlarged form of enhanced cooperation by the third round of adopting projects 
and took up coordination and participation of projects in the highest number among all EU members. 
Efstathiou et al. (2019) argued that PESCO primarily serves as an extraneous and reassuring label and as a 
means to provide extra funding to existing programs, since these projects rely on funding from the European 
defense industrial development program (EDIDP) and its successor, the European Defense Fund (EDF). The 
quick multiplication of PESCO projects can result in competition between different projects and clusters of 
defense supply chains and it presents a dilemma for the attribution of funds: a choice between funding a small 
number of niche and large capability projects or fracturing funds amongst a large number of smaller projects 
due to political and diplomatic considerations.10 This already constrained setup have met with the uncertainties 
presented by the Multiannual Financial Framework negotiations for the EDF total sum – solving the attribution 
dilemma by splitting the baby half – leaving all potential recipients largely undercut.11 Uncertainties of the 
2021-2027 MFF suggest that funding common defense capabilities remains subordinate to other more pressing 
priorities (especially amid the economic consequences of the COVID-19 crisis), which leaves the projects as a 
network of rather empty shells. 
Therefore, the prospects of realizing PESCO projects to the extent that they would effectively contribute to 
priority capabilities for the EU’s Level of Ambition or in developing economies of scale are rather limited. 
However, their significance is apparent in showing Member States’ preferences in creating cooperative links 
with other countries, reflecting the directions chosen in the future of interoperability and strategic convergence 
on a European scale. This is further strengthened by micro or soft foundations of interoperability such as 
engendering channels for cooperation, trust and information sharing, which are essential building blocks of 
strategic convergence. Thus, examining the constellation of EU Member States’ cooperation in PESCO can 
provide patterns of interstate cooperation that are susceptible to path-dependence not only in terms of economies 
of scale or cross-border supply chains but through the more subtle institutional channels serving convergence 
through dialogue. More importantly, such network analysis can reveal more about European defense clusters, 
and strategic decisions of individual pMS. 
When interpreting the results of PESCO projects’ network analysis, it is important to keep in mind that any 
analysis of PESCO projects can be considered as only one segment of the various European interstate defense 
cooperation projects that are in effect today. Considering a comprehensive overview on the network of European 
defense cooperation, the network analysis on PESCO projects should be extended with other bi- and multilateral 
defense cooperation projects, which exist in various forms. This variety is apparent in projects on the bilateral 
level (e.g. British–French, Franco–German), some on the sub-regional (e.g. Benelux, Baltic, Nordic, Visegrad) 
and some on the broader EU (e.g. EU Battlegroups, EDA projects), and European (e.g. European Intervention 
Initiative) level. The intensity of these projects varies on a broad spectrum as well. Some of them cover 
operational cooperation, while others are focusing on pooling and sharing capabilities or co-development (such 
as capability projects coordinated by EDA).12 Similarly to other already existing forms of cooperation, PESCO 
projects show a mixed picture with regards to their intensity, which stretches from co-development to sharing 
 
10 Yvonni-Stefania EFSTATHIOU – Connor HANNIGAN – Lucie BÉRAUD-SUDREAU: Keeping the momentum in European 
defence collaboration: An early assessment of PESCO implementation. 10.  
11 Financial Framework (MFF) 2021-2027: Negotiating Box with figures, [online], 05 12 2019, Source: consilium.europa.eu [30 03 
2020.] 
12 Bence NÉMETH – Tamás CSIKI: Perspectives of Central European Multinational Defence Cooperation: A New 
Model? In Marian Majer – Robert Ondrejcsák (Eds.), Panorama of Global Security Environment 2013. Bratislava: Centre for European 
and North Atlantic. Affairs. 11-24 and Jean Pierre MAULNY – Fabio LIBERTI: Pooling of EU Member States Assets in the 
Implementaion of ESDP, [online], 2008. Source: europarl.europa.eu [30 03 2020] 
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best practices. Thus, the analysis of PESCO contributes to our partial understanding of European defense 
cooperation patterns, as well as to the preferences of certain groups of member states and individual countries. 
Nevertheless, it can highlight the post-Brexit dynamics and directions of building defense cooperation across 
continental Europe.  
 
Account of Member States’ involvement in PESCO projects 
 
 
Figure 1. Project size by participating Member States (pMS) 
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Projects’ size by number of participating member states (pMS)  
 
By the third round of PESCO project adoption (12 November 2019) the 25 members have adopted 47 projects, 
which vary in their number of participating member states. While the smallest projects consist of only 2 
members, the largest has 24 members. The number of member states in PESCO projects show a descending 
order, with fewer projects having more members. Based on membership count, most projects can be categorized 
as Tiny or Mini in their size: there are 20 Tiny (9 projects with participation of two and 11 projects with 
participation of three members); 17 Mini (with four to six members). Only the small fraction of eight projects 
amounts to be Midi with seven to eleven members, and there are just two Large projects with 15 and 24 
members. Overall, only 1/5 of the projects involve more than 7 members. (See Figure 1.) 
 
Project involvement of participating Member States (pMS): Coordination and Membership  
 
Each project is carried forward by varying groups of PESCO participating Member States (Project Members) 
and is led by one or more PESCO participating Member States (Project Coordinator). 
  
 
Figure 2. Member States’ involvement in PESCO projects13 
 
The membership and coordination account of pMS can be cathegorized into five groups by size. Ireland (2) 
Luxemburg (3) the Baltic states (Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia) (3) and Slovenia (4) participate in a small 
number of projects, ranging from 2 to 4 projects, although Estonia and Lithuania each has a Coordinator 
position. 
The second group with membership (including coordination) in 5 to 7 projects consists of Bulgaria (5) 
Finland (5) Austria (6) Croatia (6) Slovakia (6) and Sweden (7). This group is also diverse concerning the 
coordinator (BG, AT, SK, SE) and non-coordinator (SL, FI, HR) position of states.  
The third group consists of pMS with membership (including coordination) in 9 to 10 projects, involving 
Belgium (9), Cyprus (9), the Czech Republic (9), Hungary (10) and Portugal (10). All pMS of this group has at 
least one coordinator position (Portugal has two).  
The fourth group consists of states with membership (including coordination) in 11-16 projects: Poland (11), 
the Netherlands (11), Romania (12), Greece (15) and Germany (16). Member states with few coordination 
 
13 All figures and tables in the analysis were prepared by the authors.  
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positions are Poland (1), the Netherlands (1) and Romania (2), while Greece (5) and Germany (7) are 
coordinators in a high number of projects. 
The fifth group consists of Spain, Italy and France with membership (including coordination) in 24 to 31 
projects. These basic metrics of the PESCO project membership and coordination data show that in terms of 
coordination and total membership count, France and Italy are the top ranking pMS, while Spain and Germany 
follow close behind. Although Spain participates in numerous projects, its coordination count (2) is the lowest 
among the top 5 most involved member states (FR, IT, ES, DE, GR). Even though Germany’s membership 
count is slightly ahead of Greece, its coordination of projects, which have higher number of participants qualifies 
it to the same league in terms of networks as Spain, Italy and France. Therefore, we refer to these four pMS in 
our analysis as the Big Four of EU defense cooperation (See Figure 11).  
An alternative grouping by the level of coordination shows that while many smaller pMS are non-
coordinators, most small and middle-size states aimed to coordinate at least one project – often the one towards 
which they had national capability requirements as well. Nevertheless, some pMS seem to punch above their 
weight at least relative to the majority of countries with only 1 or no coordinator position. Portugal and Romania 
with 2-2 and Greece with 5 projects are relevant here, even if their coordination is mostly constrained to Tiny 
projects involving only 2-3 pMS (e.g. Joint EU Spy School with Greece and Cyprus; EU Cyber Academia and 
Innovation Hub with Portugal and Spain; and EU Network of Diving Centers with Romania, Bulgaria and 
France), although Greece also coordinates two Midi projects (Cyber Threats and Incident Response Information 
Sharing Platform; Upgrade of Maritime Surveillance) with membership of 7 and 8 countries. 
Member states of PESCO continue to sign up to existing projects. Following the third round (November 
2019) of accepting PESCO projects, three countries have joined in late accession to already existing projects so 
far. Poland joined to the project of European Medical Command, France joined to the Upgrade of Maritime 
Surveillance project and Greece joined to the European Patrol Corvette project. We have included these late 
accessions in our dataset but note here that the membership base of current projects can further be broadened in 
the future. 
 
PESCO projects by Key Areas and CDP priorities 
 
PESCO’s three rounds consist of both operational and capability development projects. PESCO projects are 
officially categorized into seven key areas. These are Air, Systems; Cyber, C4ISR; Enabling, Joint; Land, 
Formations, Systems; Maritime; Space; Training, Facilities.14 
  
 
Figure 3. Projects by Key Areas 
 
In this section, we analyze the Project by Areas grouping. We look at countries’ participation in each project 
area category first, address rankings in coordination and membership numbers, as well as non-participation data, 
 
14 PESCO Member States Driven, [online], Source: pesco.europa.eu [30. 03. 2020.] 
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map the positions of the “Big Four” and explore, which pMS have the most diverse participation account based 
on the official Projects by Areas classification. Extending this analysis, we look at projects in each area and 
cross-reference them with Capability Development Priorities, in order to assess which priorities are well covered 
or remain unaddressed by PESCO projects. 
EU Capability Development Plan addresses 11 areas, consisting of altogether 38 priorities.15 These priorities 
include various capabilities or combined priority items, and some PESCO projects only address one or few 
capability elements behind the priority concepts.  
 
  CDP Priorities and Sub-Priorities 
1 
• Enabling capabilities for cyber responsive operation 
>> Cyber cooperation and synergies; >> Cyber R&T; >> Systems engineering framework for cyber 
operations; >> Cyber education and training; >> Specific cyber defense challenges in the air, space 
maritime and land domain 
2 
• Space-based information and communication services 
>> Earth observation; >> Positioning, navigation and timing; >> Space situational awareness; >> 
Satellite communication 
3 
• Information superiority 
>> Radio spectrum management; >> Tactical CIS; >> Information management; >> Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities 
4 
• Ground combat capabilities 
>> Upgrade, modernize and develop land platforms (manned/unmanned vehicles, precision strike); >> 
Enhance protection of forces. (CBRN, CIED, individual soldier equipment) 
5 
• Enhanced logistic and medical supporting capabilities 
>> Military mobility; >> Enhanced logistics; >> Medical support 
6 
• Naval maneuverability 
>> Maritime situational awareness; >> Surface superiority; >> Power projection 
7 
• Underwater control contributing to resilience at sea 
>> Mine warfare; >> Anti-submarine warfare; >> Harbor protection 
8 
• Air superiority 
>> Air combat capability; >> Air ISR platforms; >> Anti-Access Area Denial (A2/AD) capability; >> 
Air-to-air refueling; >> Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) 
9 
• Air mobility 
>> Strategic air transport; >> Tactical air transport including air medical evacuation. 
10 
• Integration of military air capabilities in a changing aviation sector 
>> Military access to airspace; >> Ability to protect confidentiality of mission critical information; >> 
Coordination with civilian aviation authorities; >> Adaptation of military air/space C2 capability 
11 
• Cross-domain capabilities contributing to achieve EU’s level of ambition 
>> Innovative technologies for enhanced future military capabilities; >> Autonomous EU capacity to 
test and to qualify EU developed capabilities; >> Enabling capabilities to operate autonomously within 
EU’s Level of Ambition (LoA) 
Table 1. CDP Priorities and Sub-Priorities 
 
 
15 2018 CDP revision – The EU Capability Development Priorities. 
 
 
 
8 
Institute for Strategic and Defense Studies 
ISDS Analyses 2020/15. 
© Anna NÁDUDVARI – Alex ETL – Nikolett BERECZKY 
 
 
Figure 4. Member States’ involvement in Cyber, C4ISR projects 
 
Within the Cyber, C4ISR area, Greece coordinates two projects, while members of the Big Four (FR, DE, 
ES, IT) coordinate one project each. Next to them, project leaders are Lithuania (1) and the Czech Republic (1). 
Italy’s participation is the highest in Cyber, C4ISR projects, followed by Germany (4) and Spain (4), whereas 
France, the Netherlands and Portugal are participating in 3 projects each. Bulgaria, Ireland, Latvia, Sweden, 
Slovakia and Slovenia are not participating in Cyber, C4ISR projects.  
 
Date  Project  Priorities 
11.2018 
European High Atmosphere Airship Platform 
– Persistent ISR Capability 
ISR capabilities 
Air ISR platforms 
11.2018 
One Deployable Special Operations Forces 
(SOF) tactical Command & Control (C2) 
Command Post (CP) for Small Joint 
Operations (SJO) 
Tactical CIS 
Information Management  
11.2018 
Electronic Warfare Capability and 
Interoperability Program for Future JISR 
Cooperation 
ISR capabilities 
11.2019 
Cyber and Information Domain Coordination 
Center (CIDCC) 
Cyber cooperation and synergies 
03.2018 
Strategic Command and Control (C2) System 
for CSDP Missions and Operations 
Information Management 
Enabling capabilities to operate 
autonomously within EU’s LoA 
03.2018 
Cyber Threats and Incident Response 
Information Sharing Platform 
Cyber cooperation and synergies 
Cyber R&T 
03.2018 
Cyber Rapid Response Teams and Mutual 
Assistance in Cyber Security 
Cyber cooperation and synergies  
Systems engineering frameworks for 
cyber operations 
03.2018 
European Secure Software defined Radio 
(ESSOR) 
Tactical CIS 
Radio spectrum management  
Table 2. CDP and Cyber, C4ISR projects 
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Cross-referencing with the Capability Development priorities shows that projects in the Cyber, C4ISR area 
include priorities of Information superiority and Enabling capabilities for cyber responsive operations. Within 
the area of Information superiority, armed forces’ ability to use Radio Spectrum (RS) for military activities, 
interoperable tactical Communication and Information Systems (CIS), information management within EU-led 
missions and operations and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) networked capabilities are 
addressed by C4ISR projects. Three priorities are addressed by PESCO projects from Enabling capabilities for 
cyber responsive operations: 1) cyber cooperation and synergies with relevant actors across cyber defense and 
cybersecurity areas, at EU level but also in the EU/NATO framework; 2) systems engineering frameworks for 
cyber operations which can provide Member States’ forces with common vocabulary, technical, procedural and 
organizational guidance and standards from which interoperable cyber capabilities can then be developed and 
implemented are addressed by projects; 3) cyber defense research and technology activities aiming at defensive 
cyber technologies. 
 
 
Figure 5. Member States’ involvement in Maritime projects 
 
Within the Maritime area, Italy is the only country that coordinates at least two projects, while Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Greece and Portugal are leading one project each. Greece’s participation in Maritime projects is the 
highest of all pMS, with membership in 5 different projects. France participates is 4, Italy and Portugal in 3, 
while Bulgaria, Poland and Spain in 2 Maritime projects. Germany, Austria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Finland, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia and Slovenia are not participating in any Maritime projects. With 
the missing of Germany, this is the only case, when a Big Four member is not participating at all in a project 
area.  
Cross-referencing with the 2018 Capability Development Priorities shows that projects in the Maritime area 
include priorities of Naval Maneuverability and Underwater control contributing to resilience at sea. According 
to the CDP, within the area of Naval Maneuverability, the priority of Surface superiority at sea covers 
interoperable capabilities in the domains of long endurance at sea (enabled by unmanned high-end platforms), 
modular-designed multipurpose combat ships and adaptable offshore patrol vessels. From these, one Maritime 
PESCO project address the capabilities of modular designed multipurpose combat ships (European Patrol 
Corvette). According to the CDP, the priority of Maritime situational awareness is supposed to be met by 
capabilities in the areas of recognized maritime picture, surveillance awareness, maritime patrol and 
surveillance aircraft, maritime signal intelligence, long-range coastal radar networks, tactical radar maritime 
surveillance generated by UAV and maritime C2 capabilities based on automatic data link systems and data 
fusion systems. Regarding these priorities, Maritime PESCO projects either integrate cross-domain surveillance 
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systems (using existing infrastructure, such as in Upgrade of Maritime Surveillance project) or aimed at the 
integration of Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (DIVEPACK). The priority of Power Projection is rather poorly 
addressed by Maritime projects since they do not cover long-range logistic support, nor naval aviation (including 
strike capability), although multidimensional protection of naval forces (anti-submarine assets) or support of 
power projection through surveillance capabilities can be related to this priority. 
 
Date  Project  Priorities 
11.2019 
European Patrol Corvette (EPC) 
Surface superiority 
Anti-submarine warfare 
11.2018 
Deployable Modular Underwater Intervention 
Capability Package (DIVEPACK) 
Enabling capabilities to operate 
autonomously within EU’s LoA 
03.2018 
Harbor & Maritime Surveillance and Protection 
(HARMSPRO) 
Mine warfare  
Harbor protection 
Maritime situational awareness 
11.2019 
Maritime Unmanned Anti-Submarine System 
(MUSAS) 
Anti-submarine warfare 
03.2018 
Maritime (semi-) Autonomous Systems for Mine 
Countermeasures (MAS MCM) 
Mine warfare 
03.2018 Upgrade of Maritime Surveillance Maritime situational awareness 
Table 3. CDP and Maritime projects 
 
According to the CDP, from the area of Underwater control contributing to resilience at sea, the priority of 
maritime countermine warfare relies on a European concept of operations, dedicated unmanned systems as well 
as military/countermine diving capabilities. The priority of anti-submarine capabilities covers water space 
management, unmanned and fixed detection systems, counter torpedo systems and a detection/response system 
by air assets, while the priority of harbor protection is based on permanent detection systems of harbor 
approaches from the sea and resilience of naval critical infrastructure. PESCO maritime projects address some 
aspects of these priorities, although they do not completely cover all their segments.  
 
 
Figure 6. Member States’ involvement in Land, Formations, Systems projects 
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Within the Land, Formations, Systems area Italy is the only country that coordinates at least two projects, 
while Italy is also the lead nation in terms of participation with membership in 4 different projects. Besides, 
France, Germany, Estonia and Slovakia are also project coordinators in the area. France and Spain are 
participating in 3 Land, formations, systems projects, though the latter does not coordinate any of them. They 
are followed by Greece, Hungary, Belgium, Cyprus, Slovakia and Germany with two project memberships. 
Bulgaria, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Slovenia are not participating in any 
Land, formations and systems projects.  
 
Date Project  Priorities 
03.2018 
Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicle / 
Amphibious Assault Vehicle / Light 
Armored Vehicle 
Upgrade, modernize and develop land 
platforms (manned vehicles) 
03.2018 
Indirect Fire Support (EuroArtillery) 
Upgrade, modernize and develop land 
platforms (precision strike) 
11.2018 
EU Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) Land 
Battlefield Missile System 
Upgrade, modernize and develop land 
platforms (precision strike) 
03.2018 
Deployable Military Disaster Relief 
Capability Package 
Enabling capabilities to operate autonomously 
within EU’s Level of Ambition 
03.2018 
EUFOR Crisis Response Operation Core 
(EUFOR CROC) 
Enabling capabilities to operate autonomously 
within EU’s Level of Ambition 
11.2018 
Integrated Unmanned Ground System 
(UGS) 
Upgrade, modernize and develop land 
platforms (unmanned vehicles) 
Table 4. CDP and Land, formations, systems projects 
 
Cross-referencing Land, formations, systems projects with the 2018 Capability Development Priorities 
shows that they primarily address the priority to upgrade, modernize and develop land platforms within the area 
of Ground combat capabilities. This includes ground-based precision strike capabilities, as well as manned and 
unmanned vehicles, since PESCO projects address Infantry Fighting Vehicles, indirect fire support and anti-
tank weapons (EuroArtillery, BLOS). Within the CDP area of Cross-border capabilities contributing to achieve 
EU’s level of ambition, Land, Formations and Systems projects also address enabling capabilities to operate 
autonomously within the EU’s LoA, which is in connection with EU CSDP Permanent Strategic, Military 
Strategic and Tactical Command and Control and Stabilization/Capacity building capabilities. 
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Figure 7. Member States’ involvement in Training, Facilities projects 
 
Greece and Romania coordinates the most Training and facilities projects (2-2 each). From the Big Four, 
France (1), Italy (1), Germany (1) are present among coordinatiors, while Hungary, Poland, and Protugal are 
also leading 1 project each. With regards to membership, France (5) has the highest participation score in 
Training, facilities projects, followed by Italy and Romania (4-4). Greece and Spain are participating in 3 
projects, while Germany, Hungary, Poland and Sweden have 2-2 memberships. Belgium, Estonia, Finland, 
Croatia, Lithuania, Latvia are not participants in Training,facilities projects. 
 
Date Project  Priorities 
03.2018 
European Training Certification Centre for 
European Armies 
Autonomous EU capacity to test and to 
qualify EU developed capabilities 
11.2018 Joint EU Intelligence School Non-categorized 
11.2019 
EU Cyber Academia and Innovation Hub (EU 
CAIH) 
Cyber education and training 
11.2019 
Special Operations Forces Medical Training Centre 
(SMTC) 
Medical support 
11.2018 
Helicopter Hot and High Training (H3 Training) 
Enabling capabilities to operate 
[autonomously] with the EU’s LoA 
11.2019 CBRN Defense Training Range (CBRNDTR) Enhance protection of forces (CBRN)  
11.2019 
European Union Network of Diving Centers 
(EUNDC) 
Enabling capabilities to operate 
[autonomously] with the EU’s LoA* 
11.2018 
EU Test and Evaluation Centers 
Autonomous EU capacity to test and 
to qualify EU developed capabilities 
11.2019 
Integrated European Joint Training and Simulation 
Centre (EUROSIM) 
Enabling capabilities to operate 
[autonomously] with the EU’s LoA* 
03.2018 
European Union Training Mission Competence 
Centre (EU TMCC) 
Enabling capabilities to operate 
autonomously with the EU’s LoA* 
Autonomous EU capacity to test and to 
qualify EU developed capabilities* 
Table 5. CDP and Training, Facilities projects 
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Cross-referencing with the 2018 Capability Development Priorities shows that projects in the Training, 
Facilities area can be linked to various cross-domain priorities, and they mostly relate to operational capabilites. 
Training, Facilities projects mainly address priorities of the Cross domain capabilities contribution to achieve 
the EU’s LoA area, primarily in Enabling capabilities to operate autonomously within the EU’s LoA as well 
Autonomous EU capacity to test and to qualify EU developed capabilities prior to deployment in operations and 
missions. Within the CDP area of Ground combat capabilities, priority of enhanced force protection is 
addressed in CBRN training, while the interoperability of Medical Support is addressed from the priorities of 
Enhanced Logistics and medical supporting capabilities. From the priorities of Enabling capabilities for cyber 
responsive operation, cyber education and training is addressed among Training, Facilities projects. 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Member States’ involvement in Enabling, Joint projects 
 
In the Enabling, Joint category, France coordinates 5, while Germany coordinates 3 projects. Besides them, 
Italy, the Netherlands and Austria are coordinating 1-1 project. The highest participation score in the Enabling, 
Joint category ultimately goes to France (11), followed by Spain (8), Romania (6), Italy (6) and Belgium (6). 
The Netherlands and Germany are participating in 5-5, whereas Hungary in 4 different projects. Ireland is the 
only state that is not involved in any Enabling, joint projects, while Estonia, Luxemburg and Latvia are only 
involved in the 24-member strong Military Mobility project. 
Similarly to the Training, Facilities area, projects in the Enabling, Joint category show a diverse picture 
when cross-referenced with 2018 Capability Development Priorities. While most projects contribute to priorities 
related to Enhanced logistic and medical supporting capabilities (Military Mobility, Medical Support, 
Enhanced Logistics), there are projects addressing Cross domain capabilities contributing to achieve EU’s level 
of ambition, such as the priorities of enabling capabilities to operate autonomously within the EU’s LoA or 
innovative technologies for enhanced future military capabilities. 
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Date Project  Priorities 
11.2019 
European Global RPAS Insertion Architecture 
System 
Military access to airspace  
Coordination with civilian aviation authorities 
Innovative technologies for enhanced future military 
capabilities 
03.2018 
Energy Operational Function (EOF) Enhanced logistics 
11.2019 
Materials and components for technological 
EU competitiveness (MAC-EU) 
Non-categorized 
11.2018 
CBRN Surveillance as a Service 
Enhance protection of forces (CBRN, CIED, individual 
solider equipment)  
11.2019 
Timely Warning and Interception with Space-
based TheatER 
Ballistic Missile Defense  
11.2018 
Co-basing 
Enhanced logistics 
Enabling capabilities to operate autonomously within the 
EU’s LoA 
11.2018 
GeoMETOC Support Coordination Element 
(GMSCE) 
Information Management 
Enabling capabilities to operate autonomously within the 
EU’s LoA 
11.2019 
EU Collaborative Warfare Capabilities 
(ECoWAR) 
Information Management 
Enabling capabilities to operate autonomously within the 
EU’s LoA 
03.2018 European Medical Command Medical support 
03.2018 
Network of Logistic Hubs in Europe and 
Support to Operations 
Enhanced logistics 
03.2018 Military Mobility Military mobility 
Table 6. CDP and Enabling, Joint projects 
 
According to the CDP, these innovative technologies cover a few key domains such as artificial intelligence 
(AI), unmanned systems, remotely-operated or autonomous medical systems, autonomous and automated 
guidance, navigation and control (GNC) and decision-making techniques for manned and unmanned systems, 
multi-robot control or advanced materials, processes and technologies. The project of European Global RPAS 
Insertion Architecture System only vaguely addresses these domains by the development of concepts, doctrines 
and standardization for Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) and Counter-UAS use as well as basic and advanced 
training on selected RPAS. Thus, this project addresses priorities within the area of Integration of military air 
capabilities in a changing aviation sector, such as Military access to airspace and interoperability and 
coordination with civilian aviation structures, infrastructures and procedures while maintaining military-to-
military interoperability. Enabling, Joint projects also include contributions to priorities of Information 
superiority (Information Management); Ground combat capabilities (Enhance protection of forces in CBRN) 
as well as Air superiority (Ballistic Missile Defence).  
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The Air, Systems area shows the Big Four’s leadership dominance – with France leading 2, Italy, Germany, 
Spain leading 1-1 projects each. Besides these member states, the Czech Republic (2) and Sweden (1) are also 
participating in Air Systems projects. 
The two projects in the Space filed show the leadership of France and Italy. The other two Big Four member 
states are also participating in 1-1 projects. Besides them, Poland and Belgium are involved in this area. 
 
Date Project   Priorities 
11.2018 
Counter Unmanned Aerial System (C-UAS) 
Anti-access area denial (A2AD) 
capabilities 
11.2018 European Attack Helicopters TIGER Mark III Air combat capability 
11.2019 
Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) 
Air combat capability  
Power projection 
11.2018 
European MALE RPAS 
Air ISR platforms 
Air combat capability 
Table 7. CDP and Air, Systems projects 
 
Projects included in the Air, Systems area feature priorities of Air superiority. This includes the priority of 
Air combat capability addressed by projects aiming at attack helicopter fleets, airborne electronic attack 
capabilities and armed remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS). Furthermore, the MALE RPAS project also 
addresses the priority of Air ISR platforms. According to the CDP, anti-access – area denial capabilities are 
based on long-range radars, counter UAV and tactical anti-missile capabilities as well as short-range air defense 
systems. This latter priority is addressed by one project that aims at countering mini and micro Unmanned Aerial 
Systems (C-UAS). 
 
Date Project   Priorities 
11.2018 
European Military Space Surveillance Awareness 
Network (EU-SSA-N) 
 Space Situational Awareness 
11.2018 EU Radio Navigation Solution (EURAS)  Positioning, Navigation and Timing 
Table 8. CDP and Space projects 
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Figure 9. Member States’ involvement 
in Air, Systems projects 
 
Figure 10. Member States’ involvement 
in Space projects 
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Space PESCO projects can be linked to the CDP area of Space based information and communication 
services, relating to priorities of Space situational awareness (space surveillance and tracking capabilities) and 
Positioning, Navigation and timing to support military activities. 
 
Evaluating pMS participation in PESCO projects by Key Areas and Capability Development Priorities 
 
Participation accounts in Projects by Key Areas showed that the Big Four countries are involved in all 7 area 
categories, except for Germany in Maritime projects. Apart from the Big Four, the most diverse participation 
package belongs to two Visegrad countries, which participate in 6 areas out of 7: Poland (except for Air, Systems 
area) and the Czech Republic (except for Space projects). The Netherlands and Greece follow closely behind, 
participating in 5 areas out of 7, both except for Air, Systems and Space areas. 
Cross-referencing projects’ CDP priorities shows what remain as missing or weakly addressed capabilities 
for PESCO (Table 8.), nevertheless there are EDA activities and projects aiming at some of these not covered 
priorities, therefore in order to assess the overall development of Capability Development Priorities, not only 
PESCO projects, but all EU-linked interstate defence cooperations should be taken into consideration. Here we 
can highlight how PESCO projects relate to these priorities.  
Space-based information and communication services remain poorly covered since no projects address 
priorities of Earth observation and Satellite communication. However, Satellite communication is addressed by 
EU SatCom Market activity within the coordination of EDA since 2009 and it involves 19 EDA member states 
(AT, BE, CY, EE, ES, DE, FI, FR, GR, IE, IT, LT, LU, LV, PL, PT, RO, SE, UK) and the Republic of Serbia.16 
From the area of Ground Combat Capabilities, the priority of Enhance protection of forces is limited to the 
field of CBRN, as no C-IED or individual solider equipment capabilities are addressed by PESCO projects. 
Nevertheless all 27 EDA members participate in the Counter IED program since 2009, which focuses on the 6 
operational areas (Detect, Mitigate, Neutralize, Exploit, Predict, Prevent).17 Protection of forces is also 
complemented by the EDA activity of Project Team Personnel Recovery (PT PR) led by Germany, involving 
12 more countries (AT, BE, CZ, CY, DE, FR, HU, IT, NL, PL, RO, SE).18 
In the area of Naval maneuverability and Underwater control contributing to resilience at sea, capabilities 
are addressed under each priority, although not in a full spectrum. Nevertheless, the item of Power projection 
remains weakly covered by PESCO. EDA activities complementing Maritime capabilities exist too, such as 
Unmanned Maritime Systems (UMS), which currently involves ten EDA Member States (BE, FI, FR, DE, IT, 
NL, PL, PT, ES and SE) and Norway.19 Here the EDA project of Maritime Surveillance (MASUR) can be 
mentioned, which involves 20 countries (BE, BU, CY, DE, EL, ES, FI, FR, IE, IT, LT, LV, MT, NL, PL, PT, 
SE, SI, UK + NO),20 as well as the Maritime Mine Counter Measures – New Generation project involving 6 
countries (BE, EE, DE, NL, NO, SE).21 
Priorities of the Integration of military air capabilities in a changing aviation sector are weakly addressed by 
PESCO (with only one relevant project), missing priorities are the adaptation of military air/space C2 capability 
and increasing the ability to protect confidentiality of mission-critical information. Most PESCO projects add 
to the aims of Cross-border capabilities contributing to achieve the EU’s level of ambition through Enabling 
capabilities to operate autonomously. Within this area though, the priority of Innovative technologies for 
enhanced future military capabilities (which focuses on the key domains of artificial intelligence, unmanned, 
 
16 EU SatCom Market, [online], 03 02 2020. Source: eda.europa.eu [06 04 2020]  
17 Counter-IED, [online], 19 02 2018. Source: eda.europa.eu [06 04 2020]  
18 Project Team Personnel Recovery (PT PR), [online], 02 02 2020. Source: eda.europa.eu [06 04 2020]  
19 Unmanned Maritime Systems (UMS) research, [online], 10 06 2015. Source: eda.europa.eu [06 04 2020]  
20 Maritime Surveillance (MARSUR), [online], 30 09 2019. Source: eda.europa.eu [06 04 2020]  
21 Maritime Mine Counter Measures - New Generation, [online] 08 12 2014. Source: eda.europa.eu [06 04 2020]  
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remotely-operated, autonomous or automated systems, multi-robot control or advanced materials, processes and 
technologies) is missing from PESCO projects. 
 
 
Table 9. Coverage of Capability Development Priorities by PESCO projects 
CDP areas and priorities
 Number of PESCO 
projects relating to it
Cyber cooperation and synergies 3
Systems engineering frameworks for cyber operations 1
Cyber educcation and training 1
Cyber R&T 1
Specific cyber defence challenges in the air, space maritime and land domain 0
Space situational Awareness 1
Positioning, Navigation and timing 1
Earth observation 0
Satellite communication 0
ISR capabilities 2
Information Management 3
Tactical CIS 2
Radio spectrum management 1
Enhance protection of forces (CBRN,CIED, individual soldier equipment) 2
Upgrade, modernize and develop land platforms (manned/unmanned vehicles, precision strike) 4
Military Mobility 1
Enhanced Logistics 3
Medical Support 2
Maritime situational awareness 2
Surface superiority 1
Power projection 1
Mine warfare 2
Anti-submarine warfare 2
Harbour protection 1
Anti-access area denial (A2AD) capabilities 1
Air ISR platforms 2
Air Combat Capability 2
Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD). 1
Air-to-air refuelling 0
Strategic air transport 0
Tactical air transport including air medical evacuation 0
Military access to airspace 1
Ability to protect confidentiality of mission critical information 0
Coordination with civilian aviation authorities 1
Adaptation of military air/space C2 capability 0
Innovative technologies for enhanced future military capabilities 2
Autonomous EU capacity to test and to qualify EU developed capabilities 3
Enabling capabilities to operate autonomously within EU’s Level of Ambition (LoA). 13
Naval maneuverability  
Enabling capabilities for cyber responsive operation
Space-based information and communication services
Information superiority
Ground combat capabilities
 Enhanced logistic and medical supporting capabilities
 Underwater control contributing to resilience at sea
 Air superiority
Air mobility
 Integration of military air capabilities in a changing aviation sector
 Cross-domain capabilities contributing to achieve EU’s level of ambition
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Some capabilities, which are not covered by PESCO, are addressed by other cooperative projects within the 
EU, mostly coordinated by the European Defence Agency. For instance, from the area of Air superiority, Air-
to air refueling remains an unaddressed priority for PESCO projects, but this priority is addressed by an Air-to-
Air refueling Pooling and Sharing Initiative coordinated by the EDA, including a pooled fleet of Airbus A330 
Multi Role Tanker Transport (A330 MRTT) aircraft among the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany and 
Norway.22 Regarding the area of Air mobility, no PESCO project aims at Strategic air transport and Tactical 
air transport capabilities, although air mobility is addressed by the European Air Transport Fleet Programme 
(EATF) that began in 2011 and has evolved to the European Tactical Airlift Centre (ETAC) with eleven 
members (BE, BG, CZ, DE, ES, FR, IT, LU, NL, NO, and PT).23 
 
Network Analysis of pMS in PESCO projects 
 
An emerging East-West Imbalance 
 
 
Figure 11. The PESCO-network of 25 participating member states 
 
Figure 11 shows the complete PESCO network of all 25 participating member states. The bigger nodes 
indicate that a country has more connections, while the darker and thicker lines indicate that the connection 
between two countries features more joint projects (for example: Italy and France have 17 common projects, 
while Estonia and Italy have only 2). The 25 pMS are tied to each other with 897 connections in total, among 
which the strongest connection is between France and Spain (20 common projects), whereas there is only 1 
 
22 Air-to-Air Refuelling, [online], 21 10 2019. Source: eda.europa.eu [06 04 2020]  
23 European Air Transport Fleet (EATF), [online], 18 06 2017. Source: eda.europa.eu [06 04 2020]  
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country (Ireland) which does not have connections to the remaining 24 countries. Logically, when a member 
state participates in more projects, it will have more connections with other member states. For example, Ireland 
has only 17 connections, while France has 157. Except for Ireland, every member state is tied to everyone, 
(primarily through the Military Mobility project which involves 24 member states), but the strength of their 
connections are diverse. The Big Four countries are involved in 462 connections, which is more than half of the 
total number of connections.  
Figure 12 highlights those connections, which feature at least 5 common projects. This reveals that small 
and medium-sized member states are more tied to the Big Four than to other countries. This is not surprising, 
keeping in mind the generally bigger number of PESCO projects are run by the former group. Nevertheless, the 
difference with regards to connections featuring at least 5 common projects is still striking. There are altogether 
50 connections that reach the level of at least 5 common projects. Out of these, at least one Big Four member is 
involved in 41 connections. In contrast, the remaining 21 member states have only 9 connections featuring at 
least 5 common projects that does not affect the Big Four. The difference is significant enough to qualify it as 
a structural pattern that does not only emerge from the generally bigger volume of PESCO projects. Practically, 
this means that member states are rather aligning their PESCO capability developments with the Big Four than 
with anyone else. This makes the overall PESCO network fundamentally centralized, in which everyone is tied 
to the core, while the relations among the peripheral nodes are rather limited. 
  
 
Figure 12. All PESCO connections featuring at least 5 common projects 
 
Among the Central and Eastern European member states there is only one (the Polish–Hungarian) relation 
that reaches the volume of 5 common projects. It is interesting to observe however, that three medium/small-
sized member states (Poland, the Netherlands and Belgium) are forming a relatively strong triangle, in which 
the three countries are tied to each other with at least 5 common projects. Besides this triangle, the Netherlands 
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functions as a medium-sized hub, since the country is also tied to the Czech Republic, Romania and Finland 
with at least 5 common projects.  
Understandably, countries that are involved in less than 5 projects (including Ireland, Estonia, Luxemburg, 
Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia) cannot have connections with any other member states that are based on at least 
5 common projects. Similarly, Austria participates in 6 projects only, and it does not have 5 common projects 
with anyone. Interestingly, whereas Finland and Bulgaria participate only in 5-5 projects, Finland has 5 
connection with the Netherlands and Bulgaria has 5 connections with France out of their total 5 projects. 
The imbalance between the core and the periphery is even more visible if one counts only those connections, 
which feature at least 8 common projects. (Figure 13) Apart from the Big Four, there are only 5 other countries 
(the Czech Republic, Romania, the Netherlands, Greece, Belgium) that have at least one connection in this 
category. Here all 14 connections are linked to a member of the Big Four, and the Big Four countries are all 
tied to each other with more than 8 common projects. Besides the intra-Big Four connections, Germany is tied 
to the Czech Republic, France is tied to Romania and Belgium, Italy is tied to Greece, while Spain is tied to 
Belgium with at least 8 common projects. 
  
 
Figure 13. All PESCO connections featuring at least 8 common projects 
 
Figure 14 represents those connections of each Big Four countries (France, Italy, Spain, and Germany) 
which feature at least 5 common projects. Altogether, Big Four members are tied to each other with 87 common 
projects (France–Germany: 14; France–Spain: 20; France–Italy: 17; Germany–Spain: 13; Germany–Italy: 9; 
Spain–Italy: 14). Looking at the external relations of the Big Four, Italy and Spain have connections featuring 
at least 5 common projects with 10-10 other members while France has such connections with 11 members. 
From this aspect, Germany’s network is the least diverse, since Berlin has only 5 non-Big Four partners on the 
level of 5 common projects. This comparison also reveals that the Czech Republic, Poland, Belgium and the 
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Netherlands are tied to each Big Four members with at least 5 common projects, whereas Cyprus, Greece, 
Portugal, Hungary and Romania are tied to three Big Four members on this level. 
  
 
Figure 14. All PESCO connections of the Big Four featuring at least 5 common projects 
 
Figure 15 reveals noteworthy dynamics regarding the 11 Central and Eastern European member states’ 
internal PESCO network. There is only one connection featuring at least 5 common projects (Hungary–Poland) 
and two connections on the level of 4 common projects (Romania–Poland and Hungary–Slovenia). This is only 
partly explained by the fact that four countries from the region (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia) participate 
in less than 5 projects, since apart from them, the other seven Central and Eastern European countries have 21 
connections featuring at least 5 common projects with non-Central and Eastern European countries. 
Interestingly, smaller PESCO contributors like Slovenia or Croatia have stronger intra-regional ties than 
relatively bigger contributors, like the Czech Republic or Romania. However, intra-regional relations altogether 
are rather weak and limited, while the participation in PESCO does not lead to the emergence of a clear Central 
and Eastern European sub-cluster.  
 
 
 
22 
Institute for Strategic and Defense Studies 
ISDS Analyses 2020/15. 
© Anna NÁDUDVARI – Alex ETL – Nikolett BERECZKY 
 
 
Figure 15. The internal PESCO network of Central and Eastern European member states 
 
The V4 in PESCO 
 
The analysis of the Visegrad Group’s PESCO network also shows that the internal V4 connections remain 
similarly weak. Concurrently with the Netherlands, Poland is the 7th biggest PESCO contributor, and the 
second biggest contributor among Central and Eastern European member states after Romania.  
 
Figure 16: The PESCO network of Poland 
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Warsaw coordinates 1 project and participates in 10 other projects. Out of these, 3 are in the Enabling, Joint 
category, 2 in the Training, Facilities, 2 in the Cyber, C4ISR, 2 in the Maritime, 1 in the Land, Formations, 
Systems and 1 in the Space categories.Poland has at least 5 common projects with 7 member states, including 
France, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands (7 projects), Belgium and Spain (6 projects), as well as Hungary (5 
projects). Additionally, Poland has 11 partners with 3 or 4 common projects. This level of relations has a strong 
regional focus in the Polish case and includes Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia as well as two larger PESCO contributors, namely Portugal and Greece.  
Hungary coordinates 1 PESCO project and participates in additional 9 projects. Together with Portugal, this 
makes Hungary the 9th biggest PESCO contributor among member states and the third biggest contributor 
among Central and Eastern European member states after Romania and Poland. Out of these projects, 4 are in 
the Enabling, Joint category, 2 in the Training, Facilities, 2 in the Land, Formations, Systems and 2 in the Cyber, 
C4ISR categories. Hungary has four major PESCO partners including France and Spain (6 common projects), 
as well as Germany and Poland (5 common projects). The place of Germany and Poland within Hungary’s 
PESCO network are less surprising, keeping in mind the generally strong political, economic and defense 
cooperation ties between Budapest and Berlin as well as between Budapest and Warsaw. It is rather surprising 
however, that Hungarian–French and Hungarian–Spanish PESCO relations are much stronger. On the other 
hand, Italy is missing from this category, contrary to the relatively strong defense ties between Rome and 
Budapest (e.g. Multinational Land Force Battle Group). Besides these four major partners, Hungary has 10 
PESCO partners with 3 or 4 common projects. This category includes large and medium-sized PESCO 
contributors like Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands, as well as partner countries from the region like Slovenia, 
the Czech Republic, Croatia, Austria, Slovakia, Cyprus and Greece. Interestingly, Hungary and France are the 
most important PESCO partners for Slovenia (4 common projects). Nevertheless, there are 10 countries that are 
almost invisible on Hungary’s PESCO network (2, 1 or 0 common projects). This list includes not only smaller 
or geographically distant member states like Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Ireland or Portugal, but 
also countries from the region such as Romania or Bulgaria. 
  
 
Figure 17: The PESCO network of Hungary 
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Prague is the 11th biggest PESCO contributor. Similarly to Belgium and Cyprus, the Czech Republic 
coordinates 1 project and participates in additional 8 projects. Prague has 3 projects in the Enabling, Joint 
category; 2 in the Cyber, C4ISR; 2 in the Air, Systems; 1 in the Training, Facilities and 1 in the Land, 
Formations, Systems categories. Among the V4 countries, the Czech PESCO network is the most connected to 
the Big Four. Out of 9 PESCO projects, the Czech Republic participates with Germany in 8, and with Spain in 
7, making Berlin and Madrid the most important PESCO partners for Prague. The Czech Republic also holds 
connections featuring at least 5 common projects with France and the Netherlands (6 common projects) and 
Italy (5 common projects). The Czech Republic has only five partners with 3 or 4 common projects, including 
Belgium, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Sweden. At the same time, Prague has weaker connections (2 or 1 
common projects) with the remaining 15 members, which includes neutral countries (like Finland or Austria) 
as well as all remaining Central and Eastern European countries, but also relatively bigger PESCO contributors 
like Greece or Portugal.   
 
 
Figure 18: The PESCO network of the Czech Republic 
 
Slovakia is the 15th biggest PESCO contributor with 1 project coordination and additional 5 project 
participations. Amongst these projects, 3 belong to the Enabling, Joint area, 2 to the Land, Formations, Systems 
area and 1 to the Training, Facilities area. This relatively modest participation in PESCO defines the structure 
of the country’s PESCO network. Slovakia has 5 common projects with Italy, which makes Rome the most 
important PESCO partner for Bratislava. Besides that, Slovakia has 9 partners with 3 or 4 common projects, 
including the remaining three members of the Big Four, and relatively bigger contributors like the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Greece, Sweden, Poland and Hungary. Thus, from the Central and Eastern European region only 
Hungary and Poland play a relatively significant role in Slovakia’s PESCO network. The remaining 15 member 
states are less visible (2, 1 or 0 common projects) on the network. The group includes Finland, Ireland, Portugal, 
Austria and with the exceptions of Hungary and Poland all member states that joined the EU after 2004. 
Surprisingly, the Czech Republic also falls into this category, contrary to the relatively strong ties between 
Prague and Bratislava. 
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Figure 19: The PESCO network of Slovakia 
 
The analysis of the V4 countries’ PESCO networks reveals the limits of defense cooperation within the 
group regarding the PESCO framework. Altogether, V4 members are tied to each other with 19 common 
projects, while this number was 87 in the case of the Big Four. Out of these, Hungarian–Polish PESCO 
connections represent the strongest intra-V4 PESCO ties with 5 common projects. Besides, all remaining intra-
V4 connections are on the level of 3 common projects, except the Czech–Slovak relation, which only features 
2 common projects. Altogether, these make the V4 less visible within PESCO, suggesting that the group did not 
coordinate its efforts in this field.  
 
 
Figure 20: The internal PESCO network of the V4 
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Conclusions 
 
PESCO projects significantly contribute to the Capability Development Priorities, primarily through 
complementing other activities and projects coordinated by EDA. This is a significant step towards achieving 
the EU’s strategic ambitions highlighted in the Global Strategy. Nevertheless, the analysis also pointed out that 
most projects are focusing creating Enabling capabilities to operate autonomously within EU’s Level of 
Ambition (LoA), while high-end capability contributions are fewer.  
At the same time, the PESCO network seems to establish a centralized structure, in which the member states 
are primarily aligning their projects with the core, but ties between peripherical nodes are rather week. 
Practically this means that PESCO embeds the positions of Big Four in the long run, while benefits and the 
visibility of the periphery remains limited, reduced to some plug-in function. This is not a surprise, keeping in 
mind the fundamental differences between European armed forces, but symbolizes how PESCO emerges as 
another area of an East-West imbalance within the Union. The analysis also highlights the lack of coordination 
between Central and Eastern European countries concerning their PESCO projects. To change this pattern, 
Central and Eastern European member states – including the V4 – could cooperate more closely when 
developing their PESCO participation plans. Since ongoing projects are usually open for newcomers, countries 
from the region could enter into existing projects keeping in mind the strengthening of intra-regional ties and 
thus, reinforcing the structure of the broader network.  
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